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Consumer Spending and the
Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008†
By Jonathan A. Parker, Nicholas S. Souleles,
David S. Johnson, and Robert McClelland*
In the winter of 2007–2008, facing an increasingly severe financial crisis and
already contemplating the limitations of traditional monetary policy, Congress and
the Administration turned to fiscal policy to help stabilize the US economy. The
Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008, enacted in February 2008, consisted primarily of a 100 billion dollar program that sent tax rebates, called economic stimulus payments (ESPs), to approximately 130 million US tax filers. The desirability
of this historically important use of fiscal policy depends critically on the extent to
which these tax cuts directly changed household spending, as well as on any subsequent multiplier or price effects.
This paper measures the change in household spending directly caused by the
receipt of the ESPs by using a natural experiment provided by the structure of the
tax cut. The ESPs varied across households in amount, method of disbursement,
and timing. Typically, single individuals received $300–$600 and couples received
$600–$1,200; in addition, households received $300 per child who qualified for the
child tax credit. Households received these payments through either paper checks
sent by mail or electronic funds transfers (EFTs) into their bank accounts. Most
importantly, within each disbursement method, the timing of receipt was determined
by the final two digits of the recipient’s Social Security number (SSN), digits that
are effectively randomly assigned.1 We exploit this random variation to estimate the
causal effect of the receipt of the payments on household spending, by comparing
the spending of households that received payments in a given period to the spending of households that received payments in other periods. We closely follow the
* Parker: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 602082001 (e-mail: Jonathan-Parker@Kellogg.Northwestern.edu); Souleles: Finance Department, The Wharton School,
2300 SH-DH, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367 (e-mail: souleles@wharton.upenn.edu);
Johnson: Social, Economic, and Housing Statistics Division, US Census Bureau, Washington, DC 20233-8500
(e-mail: david.s.johnson@census.gov); McClelland: Tax Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office, Ford
House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515 (Robert.McClelland@cbo.gov). For helpful comments, we thank
two anonymous referees, Jeffrey Campbell, Adair Morse, Joel Slemrod, seminar participants at Berkeley, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Boston University, Columbia, Duke Fuqua, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, Kellogg, Michigan, MIT Sloan, Princeton, Stanford, Wisconsin, and Wharton, and participants in presentations at the 2009 ASSA meeting, the Fall 2010 NBER Economic Fluctuations and Growth Research Meeting,
and the 2011 Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting. We thank the staff of the Division of Consumer
Expenditure Surveys at the Bureau of Labor Statistics for their work in getting the economic stimulus payment
questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Parker thanks the Zell Center at the Kellogg School of
Management for funding. The views expressed in this research, including those related to statistical, methodological, technical, or operational issues, are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of the US Census Bureau or the Congressional Budget Office, or the views of other staff members.
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2530 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s).
1
The last four digits of an SSN are assigned sequentially to applicants within geographic areas (which determine
the first three digits of the SSN) and a “group” (the middle two digits of the SSN).
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 ethodology of Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)—henceforth, JPS—which
m
analyzes the 2001 tax rebates, since one of our main objectives is to compare the
responses to the two stimulus programs.
To conduct our analysis, we worked with the staff at the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) to add supplemental questions about the payments to the ongoing Consumer
Expenditure (CE) Survey, which contains comprehensive measures of householdlevel expenditures. These supplemental questions ask CE households to report the
amount and month of receipt of each stimulus payment they received. The 2008 tax
cut was the first large tax cut to use EFTs, and EFTs are likely to be used increasingly frequently in the future. Accordingly, our CE module also asked a new question (not asked in 2001) about the method of disbursement of each payment (mailed
paper check versus EFT), as well as some other questions we analyze elsewhere.
We find that on average households spent about 12 to 30 percent of their stimulus
payments, depending on the specification, on nondurable consumption goods and
services (as defined in the CE survey) during the three-month period in which the
payments were received. This response is statistically and economically significant.
We also find a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods and related services, primarily the purchase of vehicles, bringing the average response of total CE
consumption expenditures to about 50 to 90 percent of the payments during the
three-month period of receipt.
These findings are statistically and economically broadly consistent across specifications that use different forms of variation, although the point estimates tend to be
the largest in specifications that identify the spending effects only from variation in
timing among households that receive ESPs at some point.2 The estimated effects are
similar for ESPs received by EFT compared to those received by mail. We also find
some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response in the subsequent three-month
period following that of ESP receipt. While this response cannot be estimated with
precision, it does provide evidence that the spending effects are not rapidly reversed.
Although our findings do not depend on any particular theoretical model, the
estimated response rejects the rational expectations life-cycle/permanent income
hypothesis (LCPIH), which implies no spending response to a predictable change in
income. Further, even if some households were surprised by the arrival of the ESP,
our estimated responses are large enough to reject both the LCPIH, which implies
that households should consume at most the annuitized value of a transitory increase
in income like the ESPs, and Ricardian equivalence, which implies no spending
response at all.
For comparison, JPS estimates that in 2001, upon receipt of a tax rebate, household spending on nondurable goods rose on average by 20 to 40 percent of the tax
rebate (depending on the specification), a response which is just slightly larger than
the response estimated here across similar specifications.3 However, we find larger
2
Unlike the current study, JPS had insufficient power to identify a significant spending response using only the
variation in timing of rebate receipt.
3
In subsequent work, Misra and Surico (2011) also find estimates in this range when applying quantile regressions to the JPS data. We find that trimming the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of change in dollar
consumption reduces the JPS baseline average response of nondurable goods (Douglas Hamilton pointed out a
similar result to us), but the result again stays within the reported cross-specification range. Other trimmed versions
of the JPS results are largely unchanged (e.g., the response of low income or asset households) or increase (e.g.,
the effect on total spending).
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total spending in 2008 due to significant spending on durable goods. While some of
this difference may be due to sampling error, it may also partly reflect some of the
differences in the details of the tax cut and economic environment in 2008 compared
to 2001. For instance, some prior research finds that larger payments can skew the
composition of spending towards durables, which is consistent with our findings
given that the 2008 stimulus payments were on average about twice the size of the
2001 rebates.4 That said, the overall pattern of results is broadly similar for 2001
and 2008, and so our findings suggest some robustness in the response of consumers to the broad-based tax rebates employed in these two most recent and important
recessions.
To be clear, our methodology is unable to estimate the complete effect of the ESP
program on aggregate consumption. This is because we estimate only the spending
caused by the receipt of an ESP and correlated with the timing of receipt (in particular not including any spending at the time of announcement). Also, our methodology cannot estimate the general equilibrium effects of the policy (any multiplier
or price effects). Keeping these issues in mind, our point estimates together with
the schedule of ESP disbursements imply that the receipt of the ESPs caused a
partial-equilibrium increase in demand for nondurable goods of $33 to $80 billion
(at an annual rate) in the second quarter of 2008, and $15 to $36 billion (at an annual
rate) in the third quarter. Our estimates for total CE spending imply an increase in
demand of about 1.3 to 2.3 percent of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in
the second quarter, and 0.6 to 1.0 percent of PCE in the third quarter (again at annual
rates).5 While these are substantial partial equilibrium effects, the ultimate impact
of the ESPs on aggregate consumption may be higher or lower than implied by
these calculations, due to possible changes in prices or interest rates, or to additional
spending through multiplier or anticipatory effects.
To help improve our understanding of consumption behavior, we also analyze the
heterogeneity in the spending response across households with different characteristics and across different categories of consumption expenditures. Across households,
the estimated spending responses are largest for older and low-income households,
groups which have substantial and statistically significant spending responses. The
point estimates are largest for high-asset households, but none of the results using
assets—which are not as well measured in the CE—are significant. Finally, motivated by the collapse of the housing market in 2008, we find that homeowners on

4
While JPS finds no significant response of durable goods in 2001, Souleles (1999) finds a significant increase
in both nondurable and durable goods (in particular auto purchases) in response to springtime federal income tax
refunds, which are substantially larger than the 2001 tax rebates. Federal tax refunds currently average around
$2,500 per recipient, whereas the average rebate in 2001 came to about $480 (JPS). (Aaronson, Agarwal, and
French 2012; Leininger, Levy, and Schanzenbach (2010); and Wilcox (1989) also find a significant response in
durable goods to changes in income. See also Barrow and McGranahan (2000) and Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009)
for related results for the earned income tax credit and for subprime auto sales, respectively.) Finally, temporary
subsidies to purchase prices induce intertemporal substitution and so can cause large increases in durables purchases but also later declines (Mian and Sufi 2012). By contrast, tax rebates are likely to operate through wealth and
liquidity effects, which theoretically do not imply such large reversals, as we discuss in section VII.
5
These figures are based on estimates in Tables 2 and 3 and so omit statistically insignificant lagged spending.
The calculations assume that the contemporaneous estimates represent spending done in the month of receipt and
the month after. Using estimates from Table 5 that include lagged spending effects, the corresponding estimates are,
for nondurable expenditures, $66 billion in the second quarter and $75 billion in the third, and for total spending,
$198 billion in the second quarter and $227 billion in the third, or 1.9 and 2.2 percent of PCE, respectively.
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average spent more of their ESPs than did renters, a difference that is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.
Of the many papers that test the consumption-smoothing implications of the
LCPIH, the most closely related to our work is the set of papers that uses householdlevel data and quasi-experiments to identify the effects on consumption caused by
predictable changes in income, including in particular income changes induced by
tax policy. Our current findings are consistent with several recent studies of the
spending response to tax rebates (Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007; Broda and
Parker 2008; JPS; and Bertrand and Morse 2009).6
This paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the relevant aspects of ESA
2008. Section II describes the CE data, and Section III sets forth our empirical methodology. Section IV presents the main results regarding the short-run response to the
economic stimulus payments, while Section V examines the longer-run response.
Section VI examines the differences in response across different types of households
and across different categories of expenditure. A final section concludes.
I. The 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments

ESA 2008 provided ESPs to the majority of US households (roughly 85 percent
of “tax units”). The ESP consisted of a basic payment and—conditional on eligibility for the basic payment—a supplemental payment of $300 per child who qualified
for the child tax credit. To be eligible for the basic payment, a household needed to
have positive net income tax liability, or at least sufficient “qualifying income.”7 For
eligible households, the basic payment was generally the maximum of $300 ($600
for couples filing jointly) and their tax liability up to $600 ($1,200 for couples).
Households without tax liability received basic payments of $300 ($600 for couples),
so long as they had at least $3,000 of qualifying income (which includes earned
income and Social Security benefits, as well as certain Railroad Retirement and
veterans’ benefits). Moreover, the total stimulus payment phased out with income,
being reduced by 5 percent of the amount by which adjusted gross income exceeded
$75,000 ($150,000 for couples). As a result, the stimulus payments were more targeted to lower-income households than were the 2001 tax rebates.
The key to our measurement strategy is that the timing of ESP disbursement
was effectively randomized across households. Table 1 shows the schedule of ESP
disbursement.8 For recipients that had provided the IRS with their personal bank
Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) review the consumptionsmoothing literature in general, and JPS and the working paper version of this article, Parker et al. (2011), review
the tax rebate literature in particular. A complementary set of papers surveys households about how they used or
plan to use their rebates (Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b); Coronado, Lupton, and Sheiner 2006; Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2009; Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod 2010). Parker et al. (2011) analyzes
the consistency of such self-reported spending with our regression-based causal estimates of the response of spending. Auerbach and Gale (2010) surveys recent fiscal policy more broadly.
7
To expedite the disbursement of the payments, they were calculated using data from tax year 2007 returns (and
so only those filing 2007 returns received the payments). If subsequently a household’s tax year 2008 data implied
a larger payment, the household could claim the difference on its 2008 return filed in 2009. However, if the 2008
data implied a smaller payment, the household did not have to return the difference.
8
The IRS schedule reports the latest date by which the ESPs are supposed to have been received by households.
Accordingly, as also discussed below, the payments were disbursed (i.e., put in the mail or electronically transferred
to banks) slightly earlier.
6
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Table 1—The Timing of the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008
Payments by electronic funds transfer

Payments by mailed check

Last two digits of
taxpayer SSN

Date ESP funds
transferred to account by

Last two digits of
taxpayer SSN

Date check to be
received by

00–20
21–75
76–99

May 2
May 9
May 16

00–09
10–18
19–25
26–38
39–51
52–63
64–75
76–87
88–99

May 16
May 23
May 30
June 6
June 13
June 20
June 27
July 4
July 11

Source: Internal Revenue Service (http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180247,00.
html).

routing number (i.e., for direct deposit of a tax refund), the stimulus payments were
disbursed electronically over a three-week period ranging from late April to midMay.9 For households that did not provide a routing number, the payments were
mailed using paper checks over a nine-week period ranging from early May through
early July.10 The IRS mailed a notice to the ESP recipients in advance of sending the
payments.11 Importantly, within each disbursement method, the particular timing of
the payment was determined by the last two digits of the recipients’ Social Security
numbers, which are effectively randomly assigned.
In aggregate the stimulus payments in 2008 were historically large, amounting to
about $100 billion, which in real terms is about double the size of the 2001 rebate
program. According to the Department of the Treasury (2008), $79 billion in ESPs
was disbursed in the second quarter of 2008, which corresponds to about 2.2 percent
of GDP or 3.1 percent of PCE in that quarter. During the third quarter, $15 billion
in ESPs was disbursed, corresponding to about 0.4 percent of GDP or 0.6 percent of
PCE. The stimulus payments constituted about two-thirds of the total ESA package,
which also included various business incentives and foreclosure relief.12 This article
focuses on the stimulus payments, as recorded in our CE dataset.

9
Payments were directly deposited only to personal bank accounts. Payments were mailed to tax filers who had
provided the IRS with their tax preparer’s routing number, e.g., as part of taking out a “refund anticipation loan.”
Such situations are common, representing about a third of the tax refunds delivered via direct deposit in 2007.
10
Due to the electronic deposits, about half of the aggregate stimulus payments were disbursed by the end of
May. While most of the rest of the payments came in June and July, taxpayers who filed their 2007 return late could
receive their payment later than the above schedule. Since about 92 percent of taxpayers typically file at or before
the normal April 15th deadline (Slemrod et al. 1997), this source of variation is small. Nonetheless, we present
results below that exclude such late payments.
11
For paper checks, the notices were mailed about a week before the checks were mailed. For EFTs, the notices
were sent a couple of business days before the direct deposits were supposed to be credited. The recipients’ banks
were also notified a couple of days before the date of the electronic transfers, and some banks might have credited
some of the electronic payments to the recipients’ accounts a day or more before the official payment date. For
example, some EFTs that had been scheduled to be deposited on Monday, April 28 were reported to the banks on
Thursday April 24, and some banks appear to have credited recipients’ accounts on Friday, April 25.
12
For more details on ESA, see, e.g., Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010).
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II. The Consumer Expenditure Survey

The CE interview survey contains detailed measures of the expenditures of a stratified random sample of US households. Households are interviewed four times, at
three-month intervals, about their spending over the previous three months. Because
new households are added to the survey every month, the data can be used to identify spending effects from ESPs disbursed in different months.
Questions about the 2008 ESPs were added to the CE survey in interviews conducted between June 2008 and March 2009, which covers the crucial time during
which the payments were disbursed.13 The questions were phrased to be consistent
with the style of other CE questions and the 2001 tax rebate questions. Households
were asked whether they received any “economic stimulus payments…also called a
tax rebate” since the beginning of the reference period for the interview and, if so,
the amount of each payment and the date it was received. Unlike 2001, for each payment households were also asked whether it was received by check or direct deposit.
The Appendix contains the language of the CE survey instruments.
To maintain consistency, our use of the data follows JPS. We sum all stimulus
payments received by each household in each three-month reference period to create our main economic stimulus payment variable, ESP. We use the 2007 and 2008
waves of the CE data (which include interviews in the first quarter of 2009) and
analyze only households with at least one expenditure interview during the period in
which the ESP questions were in the field. Finally, we focus on a series of increasingly aggregated measures of consumption expenditures: (i) food, which includes
food consumed away from home, food consumed at home, and purchases of alcoholic beverages; (ii) strictly nondurable expenditures, which follows Lusardi (1996);
(iii) nondurable expenditures, which follows previous research using the CE survey
and includes semi-durable categories like apparel, health, and reading materials;
(iv) total expenditures, which also includes durable expenditures such as home furnishings, entertainment equipment, and auto purchases.14
The responses to the CE questions match reasonably well the other limited
information available about the ESPs. The average value of ESP, conditional on a
positive value, is about $1,000, and about two-thirds of households reported receiving rebates during the main period of their disbursement. Households that receive
ESPs by EFT on average have slightly higher expenditures, are slightly younger,
have higher incomes and liquid assets, and have larger ESPs than households that
receive the payments by mail. Consistent with the payments specified by ESA, most
reported ESPs are in multiples of $300, with about 55 percent of reports reflecting
the (maximum) basic payments of $600 or $1,200. The aggregate amount of ESPs is
13

Ideally, since some ESPs arrived in April, the survey would have been in the field in May, e.g., for respondents
whose last interview was in May.
14
Unlike in JPS, we find that the spending effect on total expenditures in 2008 is estimated with relative statistical precision. This could in part reflect the larger number of payments (about 30 percent more) in the sample in
2008, and the larger size (over double) of these payments. Suggestive of an improvement in data quality, there is
also a decline in the ratio of the standard deviation of the change in household-level expenditures to the average
level of expenditures between 2001 and 2008 for all our major expenditure categories. This may be due to the CE
survey’s transition in 2003 from using survey booklets to using computer-assisted personal-interview (CAPI) software. The CE survey measures expenditures independent of the use of credit or debt, so the measured expenditure
for durables purchased using financing is the full price of the durable, not just the down payment.
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$94.6 billion in the weighted, raw CE data, which is quite close to the $96.2 b illion
reported in the Daily Treasury Statements (Department of the Treasury 2008). The
temporal pattern of ESP receipt is also broadly similar across the two sources, though
the CE data have fewer ESPs reported during the peak month of May and more in
the following months, suggesting the possibility that some households took time to
notice their ESP receipt or that there is some other tendency to report a somewhat
later date of receipt than actually occurred.15
III. Empirical Methodology

Consistent with specifications in the previous literature (e.g., Zeldes 1989; Lusardi
1996; Parker 1999; Souleles 1999; and JPS), our main estimating equation is
(1)	
Ci,t+1  − Ci,t= ∑  β0 s× months,i + β  ′1   Xi,t + β2  ESPi,t+1 + ui,t+1,
s

where i indexes households, and t indexes time, C is either household consumption
expenditures or their log; month represents a complete set of indicator variables
for every period in the sample, used to absorb the seasonal variation in consumption expenditures as well as the average of all other concurrent aggregate factors;
and X represents control variables (age and changes in family size) included to
absorb some of the preference-driven differences in the growth rate of consumption expenditures across households. ESPi,t+1represents our key stimulus payment
variable, which takes one of three forms: (i) the total dollar amount of payments
received by household i in period t + 1 (ESPi,t+1); (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether any payment was received in t + 1 (I(ESPi,t+1 > 0)); and (iii) a
distributed lag of ESP or I(ESP > 0), used to measure the longer-run effects of
the payments. The key coefficient β2measures the average response of household
expenditure to the arrival of a stimulus payment.16 To analyze heterogeneity in the
response to the payments, we interact ESPi,t+1with indicators for different types of
households. We correct the standard errors to allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-household serial correlation.
The Euler-equation literature focuses on testing whether predictable changes in
income are orthogonal to the residual (ui,t+1) over time; that is, whether β2  equals
zero (Chamberlain 1984; Souleles 2004). In contrast, here we use the randomized
timing of ESP receipt to ensure orthogonality between the residual and our ESP
regressor in the cross-section, which allows us to estimate β
 2 and, thus, measure the
causal effect of the payments on expenditure, regardless of whether the LCPIH is
true or not. Nonetheless, our estimate still provides a direct test of the LCPIH and
Ricardian equivalence, as discussed in the introduction.17
Our working paper Parker et al. (2011) contains more details about the data.
Our empirical approach estimates only the spending response correlated with the timing of the payment
receipt. Our approach cannot estimate the magnitude of any common response as may have occurred in anticipation
of the payments, both because the passage of ESA cannot be separated from other aggregate effects captured by our
time dummies, such as seasonality and monetary policy, and because there is no single point in time at which a tax
cut went from being entirely unexpected to being entirely expected.
17
Even though February 2008, when the ESA was passed, can fall in period t for some sample households
receiving a payment, under our maintained assumptions, any announcement effect does not bias our estimate of β2 .
Whenever information about the tax cuts underlying the ESPs became publicly available, whether preceding the
15
16
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Table 2—The Contemporaneous Response of Expenditures to ESP Receipt among All Households

Food
OLS

Strictly
nondurables
OLS

Panel A. Dollar change in spending
ESP
0.016
0.079
(0.027)
(0.046)

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS
0.121
(0.055)

Strictly
nondurables
OLS

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS

Panel B. Percent change in spending

10.9
(31.7)

74.8
(56.6)

Food
2SLS

Strictly
nondurables
2SLS

0.012
(0.033)
0.69
(1.27)

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS

121.5
(67.2)

494.5
(207.2)

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
2SLS
2SLS

Panel C. Dollar change in spending

ESP
I(ESP)

Strictly
nondurables
OLS

0.516
(0.179)

I(ESP)

Food
OLS

Food
OLS

1.74
(0.96)

2.09
(0.94)

0.079
(0.060)

0.128
(0.071)

0.523
(0.219)

3.24
(1.17)

Notes: All regressions also include a full set of month dummies, age, change in the number of adults, and change
in the number of children following equation (1). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in panel B are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent
change. The last four columns report results from 2SLS regressions where the indicator variable for ESP receipt
and the other regressors are used as instruments for the amount of the ESP. All regressions use 17,478 observations
except for the first two columns of panel B which have only 17,427 and 17,475, respectively.

IV. The Short-Run Response of Expenditure

This section estimates the change in consumption expenditures caused by receipt
of a stimulus payment during the three-month period of receipt, using the contemporaneous payment variables ESPt+1and I(ESPt +1 > 0) in equation (1). Following
JPS, we begin by estimating (the average) β
 2  using all available variation in the
full sample and subsequently refine our identification strategy by dropping nonrecipients and late recipients from our sample, and by using only the variation in the
timing of ESP receipt within each method of disbursement (check versus EFT). The
subsequent section estimates the lagged response to the payments.
A. Variation across All Households
In Table 2, the first set of four columns displays the results of estimating equation (1)
by ordinary least squares (OLS), with the dollar change in consumption expenditures
as the dependent variable and the contemporaneous amount of the payment (ESP)
as the key independent variable. The resulting estimates of β
 2  measure the average
fraction of the payment spent on the different expenditure aggregates in each column,
within the three-month reference period in which the payment was received.

actual passage of ESA or not, under the LCPIH any resulting wealth effects should be small and should have arisen
at the same time(s) for all consumers, so their average effects on expenditure would be picked up by the corresponding time dummies in equation (1). More important, heterogeneity in such wealth effects (or in β2 ) should not be
correlated with the timing of ESP receipt, so (the average) β2 should still be estimated consistently.
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We find that, during the three-month period in which a payment was received, a
household on average increased its expenditures on food by about 2 percent of the
payment, its expenditures on strictly nondurable goods by 8 percent of the payment,
and its expenditures on nondurable goods by 12 percent of the payment. The third
result is statistically significant. The fourth column shows that expenditures on total
consumption increased on average by 52 percent of the payment, a substantial and
statistically significant amount.
These results identify the effect of a payment from variation in both the timing of payment receipt and the dollar amount of the payment. While the variation
in the payment amount is possibly uncorrelated with the residual in equation (1),
the variation is not purely random since the payment amount depends upon household characteristics such as tax status, income, and number of dependents. Unlike
most previous research, we can refine the variation that we use to focus on variation
known to be exogenous.
The remaining columns of Table 2 use only variation in whether any payment
was received at all in a given period, not the dollar amount of payments received.
The second set of columns in panel A uses the indicator variable I(ESP > 0) in
 2 measures the average dollar increase in expenditures
equation (1). In this case β
caused by receipt of a payment. During the three-month period in which a payment was received, households on average increased their nondurable expenditures
by $122, which is statistically significant at the 7 percent level. Total expenditures
increased by a significant $495. Compared to an average payment of just under
$1,000, these results are consistent with the previous estimates in the first set of columns, which also used variation in the magnitude of the payments received.
As a robustness check, panel B uses the change in log expenditures as the dependent variable. On average in the three-month period in which a payment was received,
nondurable expenditures increased by 2.1 percent, and total expenditures increased
by 3.2 percent. These are statistically and economically significant effects. At the
average ESP and level of nondurable and total expenditures, these results imply propensities to spend of 0.120 and 0.364 respectively, which are consistent with, though
slightly smaller than, the previous results in the table.
Finally, to estimate a value interpretable as a marginal propensity to spend upon
payment receipt without using variation in ESP amount, we estimate equation (1) by
two-stage least squares (2SLS). We instrument for the payment amount, ESP, using
the indicator variable, I(ESP > 0), along with the other independent variables. As in
the first set of results in panel A, β
 2 then measures the fraction of the payment that is
spent within the three-month period of receipt. As shown in panel C, the estimated
marginal propensities to spend remain close in magnitude to those estimated in the
first set of results, which did not treat ESP as potentially nonexogenous.18

Parker et al. (2011) discusses how these results are generally robust across a number of additional sensitivity
checks. For example, using median regressions or winsorizing the dependent variable generally leads to very similar
results for food and strictly nondurable goods. For nondurable goods and total expenditures, the resulting coefficients are still statistically and economically significant (and substantially larger than those for strictly nondurable
goods) though generally smaller than in Table 2, which is consistent with iatrogenic bias since by mostly dropping
large durables purchases, one biases down the estimates of the average spending caused by the ESP.
18
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Table 3—The Response to ESP Receipt among Households Receiving Payments
Dollar change in

Percent change in

Dollar change in

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS

Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
2SLS
2SLS

Panel A. Sample of all households (N = 17,478)
ESP
0.117
0.507
(0.060)
(0.196)
I(ESP)
I(ESPi,t > 0 for any t)i

9.58
(36.07)

21.21
(104.00)

2.63
(1.07)
−0.88
(0.50)

Panel B. Sample of households receiving ESPs (N = 11,239)
ESP
0.185
0.683
(0.066)
(0.219)
3.91
I(ESP)
(1.33)

3.97
(1.34)
−1.17
(0.63)

5.63
(1.69)

Panel C. Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,488)
ESP
0.214
0.590
(0.070)
(0.217)
4.52
6.05
I(ESP)
(1.50)
(1.89)

0.123
(0.081)
8.23
(38.79)

0.509
(0.253)
20.77
(112.18)

0.252
(0.103)

0.866
(0.329)

0.308
(0.112)

0.911
(0.342)

Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children,
the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary
within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of columns report results from 2SLS regressions
where the indicator variable for ESP receipt and the other regressors are used as instruments for the amount of the
ESP. The variable I(ESPi,t
  > 0 for any t)i is an indicator for households that received an ESP in some reference
quarter, whereas I(ESP > 0) indicates receipt in the contemporaneous quarter (t+1) in particular.

B. Variation among Households That Receive ESPs at Some Time
The results in panel C of Table 2 identify the effect of ESP receipt on spending by
comparing the behavior of households that received payments at different times to
the behavior of households that did not receive payments during those times. Since
some households did not receive any payment, in any period, the results still use
some information that comes from comparing households that received payments to
households that never received payments. We now investigate the role of this variation using a number of different approaches, for brevity focusing on nondurable
expenditures and total expenditures.
First, we add to equation (1) an indicator for households that received a payment
in any reference quarter, I(ESPi ,t+1  > 0 for any t)i, which allows the expenditure
growth of payment recipients to differ on average from that of nonrecipients. In this
case, the main regressor I(ESP > 0) captures only higher-frequency variation in
the timing of payment receipt—receipt in quarter t+1 in particular—conditional on
receipt in some quarter. As reported in panel A of Table 3, the estimated coefficients
for the effect of the payment (ESP and I(ESP > 0)) are quite similar to those in
Table 2, and the estimated coefficients on I(ESPi ,t+1  > 0 for any t)i are statistically
insignificant. Hence, apart from the effect of the payment, there is little difference
between the expenditure growth of payment recipients and nonrecipients over the
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quarters in the sample period around the payments, and thus such a difference is not
spuriously generating the results in Table 2.
Our second approach is more stringent. We exclude from the sample all households that did not report a payment in any of their interviews. The advantage of
this approach is that, when we do not use variation in ESP amount, the response
of spending is identified using only the variation in the timing of payment receipt
conditional on receipt at some time. That is, identification comes from comparing
the spending of households that received payments in a given period to the spending
of households that also received payments but in other periods. The disadvantage
of this approach is that it leads to a reduction in power due to the resulting decline
in sample size and effective variation. Nonetheless, panel B of Table 3 shows that
the estimates are broadly consistent with the previous results, although both point
estimates and standard errors are somewhat larger.
Third, we drop all households that received late stimulus payments, after the main
period of their (randomized) disbursement. Although the timing of late payments
is not necessarily endogenous, it is not randomized. The vast majority of households that received late ESPs did so due to filing late tax returns for tax year 2007,
although as noted there also seem to be some lags in reporting (or in noticing) the
payments in the CE survey. We follow JPS and allow one month’s “grace period” in
excluding late ESPs, so that we consider a mailed payment to be late if it is reported
received after August, and an electronic payment (or any payment with missing data
on the method of disbursement) to be late if it is reported received after June.
Table 3 panel C shows that the results remain statistically and economically significant. In the final set of columns using 2SLS, on average nondurable expenditures
increased by 31 percent of the payment in the quarter of receipt, and total expenditures increased by 91 percent of the payment. Given that this approach has sufficient
power to identify the key parameter of interest, we focus on this sample as our main
sample for the remainder of the article.
As another robustness check, Figure 1 compares the histograms of the distribution
of changes in expenditure for observations during which an ESP is received versus
observations during which an ESP is not received. The figure focuses on the sample
of on-time recipients and the time period during which the ESPs were being distributed (i.e., when the t+1 interview occurs between June 2008 and October 2008,
with the corresponding expenditure reference periods covering the preceding three
months). As shown, there is a larger share of recipients than nonrecipients in most
ranges of increases in spending, and a larger share of nonrecipients than recipients in
most ranges of decreases in spending. (Each cell in panel A represents a $300 range,
and in panel B a $600 range, so these differences are economically significant).
While these histograms do not control for any covariates (which affect power, not
consistency), they support our main findings nonparametrically in the raw data and
show that outliers are not driving the main findings. The analogous histograms are
very similar for the sample in Table 2.
In sum, even when limiting the variation to the timing of ESP receipt conditional
on (nonlate) receipt, the results imply that the receipt of the ESPs had a significant
effect on household spending. By contrast, in JPS, analogously limiting the sample
to nonlate rebate recipients leads to a larger reduction in precision and a loss of
statistical significance.
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Panel A. Change in nondurable expenditure
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Figure 1. Histograms of Change in Expenditure for ESP Recipients during the Program

C. Method of Disbursement
One novel feature of the 2008 ESP program was the use of electronic funds transfers in addition to mailed checks. About 40 percent of the CE households received
their payments via EFTs. This section first asks whether the method of disbursement
affects the estimated spending impact of the ESPs. Second, since the method of
disbursement is not randomly assigned and affects the time of receipt, one can think
of the ESP program as providing two natural experiments within distinct samples.
Accordingly, we will proceed to investigate whether we can identify the causal effect
of payment receipt from only the difference in arrival times within each method of
disbursement.
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Table 4—The Response to ESP Receipt by Method of Disbursement
Dollar change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS

OLS

Panel A. Sample of all households (N = 17,281)
ESP by check
0.141
0.473
(0.077)
(0.215)
ESP by EFT
0.144
0.583
(0.081)
(0.305)
I(ESP by check)
I(ESP by EFT )

Percent change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS

2.19
(1.29)
3.35
(1.41)

OLS

3.59
(1.61)
4.00
(1.83)

Panel B. Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,362)
ESP by check
0.245
0.746
(0.086)
(0.235)
ESP by EFT
I(ESP by check)
I(ESP by EFT )

0.218
(0.090)

0.361
(0.317)

3.99
(1.63)

5.78
(2.03)

4.84
(1.81)

4.30
(2.38)

Dollar change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
2SLS

2SLS

0.112
(0.104)
0.169
(0.097)

0.333
(0.305)
0.661
(0.332)

0.308
(0.133)

0.868
(0.379)

0.313
(0.117)

0.702
(0.402)

Panel C. Households receiving only on-time ESPs allowing different effect of all non-ESP regressors by method
of disbursement (N = 10,362)
ESP
0.211
0.529
0.262
0.784
(0.078)
(0.232)
(0.149)
(0.401)
I(ESP)

3.63
(1.79)

5.48
(2.23)

Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the
age of the household, a full set of month dummies, and indicators for: (i) receiving only ESPs by check; (ii) receiving only EFTs; and (iii) receiving both checks and EFTs. In panel C, there are also separate sets of all other control
variables for households in categories (i), (ii), and (iii). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary withinhousehold correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by
100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where
I(ESP > 0), its interactions, and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions.

We begin by estimating the separate response of spending to EFTs and to paper
checks, using the analogs of ESP and I(ESP > 0) for payments received by check
and by EFT. We start with the entire sample of households, including nonrecipients,
because there is limited temporal variation within ESPs received by EFT.19 As shown
in panel A of Table 4, the pattern of estimated coefficients is generally similar across
the two disbursement methods, across all the columns. While the point estimates are
somewhat larger for the EFTs, they are not statistically significantly different. Next,
panel B uses only the variation within the households that receive only on-time ESPs.
The results are similar to those in panel A in that the estimated c oefficients are generally similar (and not statistically significantly different) across the two disbursement
methods, though now the point estimates are generally somewhat larger for the mailed
19

A few observations have missing values for the method-of-disbursement question and so are dropped from
the sample.
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checks. Not surprisingly, since the EFTs were disbursed over just a few weeks, using
just timing variation leads to relatively less power for estimating the effect of EFT
receipt, especially for the more volatile total expenditure category. Also, the smaller
number of ESPs used to identify the effects of a mailed ESP increase standard errors
as well. In sum, these results provide little evidence that the method of disbursement
significantly affected the average response of spending.
We now turn to the question of whether we can identify the spending effect using
only the randomized variation in spending within households that receive only
on-time ESPs by check and within households that receive only on-time ESPs by
EFT. This approach allows for the selection into each group to be nonrandom. For
example, households receiving EFTs have somewhat higher income on average than
households receiving paper checks and might also be different in other, hard-toobserve ways that could potentially be correlated with the differences in timing of
the two disbursement methods.
As already discussed, panels A and B of Table 4 provide some evidence that
the spending effect does not differ by method of disbursement. The coefficients in
panel B in particular are identified from variation within each group. Notably, for
ESPs received by mail, which provide more temporal variation, the results are statistically significant and broadly similar to the average response in the final panel of
Table 3. That is, even separately controlling for receipt of EFTs, using the random
variation in the timing of the mailed checks still yields a significant response of
spending to the mailed checks.
These results still impose common month dummies and common demographic
effects (age and changes in family size) across EFT and mailed-check recipients. Also,
to gauge the impact of the stimulus program, we want to estimate the average response
to the stimulus payments. Accordingly, as an extension, panel C of Table 4 presents
estimates from a pooled regression that allows for separate time dummies and demographic effects across three groups of households: (i) households that received only
paper checks; (ii) households that received only EFTs; (iii) h ouseholds that received
both paper checks and EFTs (only 2 percent of households). The resulting coefficient
measures the average spending effect of the receipt of an ESP independent of its method
of disbursement, but allowing for households to be distributed across the disbursement
methods in a way that can potentially be correlated with their spending dynamics due
to other factors. While slightly smaller and less statistically significant, the estimates in
panel C remain broadly similar to those in panel C of Table 3, even though the former
are driven only by the randomized variation in timing within each group (primarily
paper checks, since the EFTs have limited timing variation).
In sum, our findings remain broadly consistent across specifications that use different forms of variation. Of course, using different variation sometimes induces
changes in the point estimates across specifications, especially for total expenditures, but not significantly so relative to the corresponding confidence intervals.
V. The Longer-Run Response of Expenditure

To investigate the longer-run effect of the receipt of the stimulus payments, we add
the first lag of the payment variable, ESPt  , as an additional regressor in equation (1).
Under the maintained assumption that the differences in timing of ESP receipt are
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Table 5—The Longer-Run Response of Expenditures to ESP Receipt

 )
ESPt+1 or I(ESPt+1
ESPt or I(ESPt)
Implied spending effect in
second three-month
period
Implied cumulative fraction
of rebate spent over both
three-month periods

Dollar change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS
0.201
0.517
(0.067)
(0.211)

Percent change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
OLS
OLS
3.92
4.96
(1.55)
(1.96)

Dollar change in
Nondurable All CE goods
spending and services
2SLS
2SLS
0.254
0.757
(0.110)
(0.360)

−0.054
(0.080)

−0.288
(0.214)

−1.23
(1.50)

−2.22
(1.92)

−0.097
(0.113)

−0.278
(0.330)

0.146
(0.104)

0.230
(0.303)

NA

NA

0.156
(0.177)

0.479
(0.568)

0.347
(0.155)

0.747
(0.477)

NA

NA

0.410
(0.273)

1.235
(0.892)

Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the
age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time
ESPs. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of
columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as instruments for
ESP. The number of observations for all regressions is 10,488.

exogenous, the coefficient on the lag of ESP measures the (dollar or percent) change
in spending in the three-month period following the three-month period of receipt.20
We continue to focus on the sample of households that only receive ESPs on time
(as in panel C of Table 3). As shown in Table 5, the presence of the lagged variable
does not much alter our previous conclusions about the short-run impact of the payment, although the coefficients on ESPt+1are somewhat smaller than the corresponding results in panel C of Table 3. Moreover, the receipt of a payment causes a change
in spending one quarter later (i.e., from the three-month period of receipt to the next
three-month period) that uniformly is negative but smaller in absolute magnitude
than the contemporaneous change. Since the net effect of the payment on the level
of spending in the later period is given by the sum of the coefficients on ESPt  and
ESPt +1, this implies that, after increasing in the three-month period of payment receipt,
spending remains high, though less high, in the subsequent three-month period.
These lagged spending effects are, however, estimated with less precision than the
contemporaneous effects. For example, in the second-to-last column, for nondurable
expenditures using 2SLS, nondurable expenditures rise by 25.4 percent of the payment
in the quarter of receipt. The expenditure change in the next quarter is −9.7 percent, so
that nondurable expenditures in the second three-month period are still higher on net
than before payment receipt by 25.4 percent − 9.7 percent ≈ 15.6 percent of the payment (penultimate row of results). The cumulative change in nondurable expenditures
over both three-month periods is then estimated to be 25.4 percent + 15.6 percent
= 41.0 percent of the payment (bottom row). However, neither the 15.6 percent change
20
To elaborate, by comparing households that differ in the random timing of receipt, these results trace out the
on-impact and lagged effects of ESP receipt on spending, analogous to an impulse response. The lag of ESP corresponds to the second period in the impulse response. Note that these results are still partial equilibrium estimates,
and they still control for aggregate effects via time dummies.
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in the second period nor the 41.0 percent cumulative change is statistically significant.
The second-period and cumulative changes are also insignificant for total expenditure
using 2SLS. However, in the first pair of columns, using variation in the amount of the
ESP increases statistical power, so that we find a statistically significant cumulative
effect on spending for nondurable goods.21
In sum, we find only statistically weak evidence of an ongoing spending response.
Even so, these results provide some evidence against a rapid reversal of spending,
although we are unable to rule out longer-term reversals.
VI. Differences in Responses across Households and Goods

The leading explanation for why household spending would increase in response to a
previously announced increase in income is the presence of liquidity constraints, which
could make households unable or unwilling to increase spending until the receipt of
an ESP.22 On the other hand, other theories propose that high-wealth or high-income
households are more likely to spend their payments on receipt in part because they have
smaller costs of not optimizing to fully smooth consumption over time.23
Table 6 begins by using three different proxy variables to identify households that
may be disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained (all measured as of the
households’ first CE expenditure interviews): age, income (family income before taxes),
and liquid assets (the sum of balances in checking and saving accounts). Following
the literature, for each variable, we split households into three groups (Low and High
denoting membership in the top and bottom group), with the cutoffs between groups
chosen to include about a third of the payment recipients in each group. Expanding
equation (1), we interact the intercept and ESPt+1variables with Low and High for each
of these proxy variables in turn. For brevity, we report only the 2SLS results.
While liquid assets is arguably the most directly relevant of the three proxy variables for identifying liquidity constraints, it is the least well measured and the most
often missing in the CE data. This sample selection could affect both power and consistency. Power is likely reduced due to the smaller samples. Consistency may or may
not be affected. In whatever way the various samples in Table 6 are determined—for
example on the basis of reported income, or the existence of reported income—under
the assumption that the timing of ESP receipt is exogenous, the estimated β2 coefficients are consistent measures of the average causal effects of interest—but only
for the particular sample under consideration, not necessarily for the entire population. The estimated β2s and their interaction terms are what we are interested in when
comparing, for instance, low-income households to high-income households: i.e., how
the average treatment effect varies across income levels. But this is not what we are
21

The coefficients are generally slightly smaller and the statistical significance slightly lower in the sample
comprising all households. If one adds a second lag of the ESP regressor to equation (1), the resulting estimated
spending caused in the third period (relative to before receipt) is again statistically insignificant. For nondurables
the point estimates are near zero. For durables, the point estimates suggest an increase in spending from the second
period after receipt to the third, and as a result an even larger estimated cumulative spending effect, but these estimates have even greater statistical uncertainty than those reported in Table 5.
22
This constraint could reflect a hard constraint as studied in Zeldes (1989), or larger interest rates for borrowing
than for saving (e.g., Davis, Kubler, and Willen 2006), or a cost for accessing illiquid wealth (e.g., Angeletos et al.
2001; Kaplan and Violante 2011).
23
See, for example, Caballero (1995); Parker (1999); Matejka and Sims (2010); and Reis (2006).
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Table 6—The Propensity to Spend across Different Households
Interaction:

Panel A. By age

Panel B. By income

Panel C. By liquid assets

Dependent variable:

Dollar change in

Dollar change in

Dollar change in

NonAll CE
durable goods and
spending services
Age
Low: ≤ 40
High: > 58
ESP
 

ESP × Low
(group difference)

ESP × High
(group difference)
Observations

Implied total spending
Low group
High group
Sample characteristics
Mean of:
Spending

0.345
(0.133)

0.952
(0.398)

Nondurable
spending

Income
Low: ≤ 32,000
High: > 74,677
0.215
(0.124)

−0.150
(0.124)

−0.461
(0.399)
0.414
(0.472)

−0.009
(0.139)

10,488

10,488

0.195
(0.114)

0.491
(0.394)

0.044
(0.151)

All CE
goods and
services

0.568
(0.442)

Nondurable
spending

All CE
goods and
services

Liquid assets
Low: ≤ 500
High: > 7,000
0.275
(0.164)

0.851
(0.558)

Panel D. By housing status
Dollar change in
Nondurable
spending

All CE
goods and
services

Housing status
Low: own with mortgage
High: own without
0.213
(0.153)

0.431
(0.455)

0.205
(0.466)

−0.253
(0.184)

−0.075
(0.186)

−0.844
(0.527)
0.083
(0.631)

0.260
(0.169)

0.800
(0.514)

8,592

8,592

5,071

5,071

10,380

10,380

0.239
(0.180)

1.283
(0.564)

0.022
(0.205)

0.007
(0.566)

0.256
(0.112)

0.974
(0.364)

0.024
(0.155)

0.715
(0.500)

0.043
(0.131)

0.543
(0.394)

0.389
(0.168)

1.366
(0.498)

0.206
(0.133)

0.773
(0.463)

0.200
(0.202)

0.934
(0.677 )

0.473
(0.175)

1.231
(0.508)

5,536

10,601

5,480

10,491

5,461

10,591

5,554

10,646

259.6
0.267
970.8

252.8
0.264
958.1

307.3
0.320
960.8

260.8
0.268
972.7

50.0

50.3

48.5

50.0

Income
Observations

60,020
[8,592]

60,020
[8,592]

59,180
[4,419]

60,288
[8,494]

Liquid assets
Observations

9,959
[5,071]

10,480
[4,419]

9,959
[5,071]

10,002
[5,017]

ESP
I(ESP)
ESP | ESP > 0
Age

Coefficient on
  ESP in subsample

0.308
(0.112)

0.911
(0.342)

0.216
(0.112)

0.808
(0.389)

0.186
(0.153)

0.662
(0.494)

0.300
(0.112)

0.929
(0.343)

Notes: All regressions also include separate intercepts for the High and Low groups, the change in the number of
adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample
includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP > 0)
and its interactions, along with the other regressors, are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions. Reported
standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All sample splits are
chosen to include about one-third of ESP recipients in each grouping.

interested in in the presence of nonresponse bias. To give the reader a sense of the
potential importance of such bias, the bottom section of Table 6 reports the means
of key observable characteristics for each sample used across the various columns of
results. While mean levels of spending, age, and income are broadly similar across
the various samples, the samples can still, of course, differ in unobservable ways. One
way of examining this is to compare the average response to the ESP (the average β
 2)
for each sample, as reported at the bottom of the Table 6, to the average response in
the overall sample. (See Table 3, and also Table 6, panel A, since age is not missing.)
Table 6 begins by testing whether the propensity to spend the ESPs differs by
age. Because young households typically have low liquid wealth and high income
growth, they are disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained (e.g., Jappelli
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1990; Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles 1998).24 In the first pair of columns in the
table, Low refers to young households (40 years old or younger) and High refers
to older households (older than 58), and the coefficients on the interaction terms
with these variables represent differences relative to the households in the baseline,
middle-age group. As reported, the point estimates for the interaction terms suggest that young households spent relatively less of the payment on receipt, and old
households spent relatively more. However these differences, while economically
large, are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, in absolute terms the spending
by old households (see “Implied total spending” for the interacted groups) and by
middle-age households (coefficient on ESP) are both statistically and economically
significant, for both nondurable and total expenditure.
Panel B in Table 6 tests for differences in spending across income groups. The
point estimates suggest that low-income households spent a much larger fraction
of their payment upon receipt on total expenditures relative to the typical (baseline
middle-income) household. However, while suggestive of a possible role for liquidity constraints, the difference between this result and that for the baseline group,
although economically large at over 70 percent of the ESP, is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, in absolute terms for total expenditures, only the response for the
low-income households is statistically significant. The response is also economically
significant, averaging 128 percent of the payment.25 Note that despite losing about a
quarter of the sample due to missing income data, the average sample characteristics at
the bottom of panel B are similar to those for panel A (which includes the entire sample, since age is not missing). Moreover, the estimated β
 2 s for the sample of income
reporters are also relatively close to that for the entire sample. These results do not provide much reason to think that nonresponse bias is a problem in the income sample.
Panel C in Table 6 tests for differences by liquid asset holdings. While the point
estimates suggest little spending by low-asset households, the associated confidence
intervals are quite large, and none of the spending differences or even levels throughout the panel are statistically significant. The loss of precision when using the asset
variable might reflect the smaller sample sizes due to missing asset values and measurement error in the available asset values. Roughly half of the data on liquid assets
are missing. As noted in the final row in the table, in the resulting sample the average
(uninteracted) estimated β2s are economically significant, but roughly a third lower
in magnitude than for the entire sample of on-time recipients and also statistically
insignificant. This difference is consistent with nonresponse bias in this subsample
(i.e., the availability of the asset data is correlated with the treatment effect).
Relative to these results, JPS found stronger spending effects in 2001 associated
with these proxies for liquidity constraints (in particular low assets). The differences
with 2008 could reflect statistical uncertainty in the estimates or issues of data quality
and the subsamples studied. There may also have been differences in the distribution

There is also evidence that older households increase their spending on receiving their (predictable) pension
checks (Wilcox 1989; Stephens 2003). Outside the null LCPIH hypothesis of β2 = 0, older households might also
spend relatively more because they have shorter time horizons on average.
25
It is not inconsistent for the average spending response to be larger in magnitude than the average payment,
even putting aside the confidence intervals for the former, if enough households buy large durables like autos in
response to receiving a payment, as found and discussed below.
24
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of credit constraints across households between the 2001 and 2008 recessions and
differences in expectations about the length and severity of the recessions.26
Another key characteristic of the recent recession was the large decline in housing wealth and the reduced ability to borrow against home equity. To examine the
potential implications for the response to the ESPs, we also estimate the differential
spending responses across households that rented (23 percent of the sample), owned
with a mortgage (50 percent), and owned without a mortgage (27 percent). The point
estimates reported in panel D of Table 6 suggest that both groups of homeowners
spent more of their ESPs than renters, but the differences are not statistically significant. Combining all homeowners into one group, the estimated spending responses
for total expenditures are 1.051 (0.351) for homeowners and 0.434 (0.454) for renters,
and these estimates are statistically significantly different at the 10 percent level.27
Turning to differences across types of expenditures, each column in panels A,
B, and C in Table 7 reports the estimated change in spending for each subcategory
of expenditures within the broad measure of nondurable expenditures (a complete
decomposition). The table also reports, for each subcategory, its implied share of
the total increase in nondurable spending caused by the ESP, and, for benchmarking,
the average share of each subcategory in nondurable expenditures (over the entire
sample). Of course, comparisons of different subsets of nondurable expenditure
must be interpreted cautiously because of potential nonseparabilities across goods,
and in general the greater variability in dependent variables renders the results at
this level of disaggregation statistically weak. 28 Nonetheless, the point estimates
suggest a disproportionately large response in alcohol, personal care (and miscellaneous items), tobacco, and apparel.
Panel D of Table 7 provides the decomposition of the response of the durable
goods and services part of total expenditures (i.e., total expenditures not in the
nondurable expenditures category). The bulk of the spending response in durables
(87 percent) comes in transportation, spending on which increases by 53 percent
of the payments on average, a statistically and economically significant amount.
This response is also large relative to the average share of transportation in durable
expenditures (27 percent). Panel E in turn decomposes the response of the different
subcategories of transportation. According to the point estimates, the transportation
response is largely driven by purchases of vehicles, primarily new vehicles. The
receipt of a stimulus payment increased the probability of purchasing a vehicle by
enough to imply a large average response of total expenditures to the payments.
These results imply that auto purchases, although weakening during the recession,
would have been even weaker in the absence of the payments.
26
For example, if constrained households in 2008 expected the recession to last longer than usual, that would
reduce the magnitude of their current response to the payment, ceteris paribus.
27
The results for homeowners do not simply reflect the preceding results for older households, e.g., if one
drops from the sample the households older than 65, the resulting coefficients for nondurable expenditure remain
very similar to those reported in the table, for all three groups of households in panel D. The coefficients for total
expenditure remain very similar for renters and homeowners with mortgages. While the coefficient for total expenditure loses significance for homeowners without mortgages, presumably in part due to the reduced sample of such
homeowners, it remains large in magnitude; and as in the table, the coefficient for nondurable expenditure remains
significant and is largest for homeowners without mortgages, compared to the other two groups.
28
Our previous results, by summing the subcategories into broader aggregates of nondurable expenditures, averaged out much of this unrelated variability (such as, for example, whether a trip to the supermarket happened to fall
just inside or outside the expenditure reference period).
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Table 7—The Propensity to Spend on Subcategories of Expenditures
Panel B. Additional categories
in strictly nondurables

Panel A. Food

Dependent variable:
Coefficient on ESP
Standard error
Implied share of increase
in nondurable
spending
Share of avg. spending on
subcategory

Food at
home

Food
away
Alcoholic
from home beverages

Personal
care
and misc.

Gas, motor
fuel, public
transportation

Tobacco
products

0.050
(0.032)

0.025
(0.033)

0.011
(0.007)

0.059
(0.027)

0.083
(0.049)

0.027
(0.039)

0.007
(0.009)

0.23

0.11

0.01

0.23

0.04

0.16

0.01

0.16

0.08

0.04

0.19

Panel C. Additional categories
in nondurables
Dollar change in
spending on:

Utilities,
household
operations

Apparel

Health

Reading

Coefficient on ESP
0.022
Standard error
(0.021)
Implied share of increase in:
Nondurable spending
0.07
Durable spending

0.025
(0.048)

−0.001
(0.003)

0.08

0.00

Avg. spending on subcategory:
Share of nondurable
0.06
Share of durable

0.15

0.27

0.09

0.02

Panel D. Additional categories in total CE spending
Housing
(incl. furnishings) Entertainment

Education
−0.100
(0.042)

Transportation

0.099
(0.092)

0.077
(0.099)

0.527
(0.269)

0.16

0.13

−0.17

0.87

0.56

0.13

0.04

0.27

0.01

Panel E. Subcategories of transportation
Dollar change in
spending on:

Other
vehicle
purchases

Maintenance
and
repairs

Other,
insurance fees,
etc.

0.011
(0.054)

0.009
(0.028)

0.027
(0.024)

Implied share of increase in durable spending
0.59
0.20

0.02

0.01

0.04

Share of average durable spending
0.07

0.01

0.04

0.09

Coefficient on ESP
Standard error

New
Used
vehicle
vehicle
purchases purchases
0.357
(0.204)

0.123
(0.149)

0.06

Notes: The first rows of each panel report results from a regression that also includes the change in the number of
adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample
includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,488 for all regressions). Reported standard errors
are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP.

Keeping in mind the degree of statistical significance, our finding of a large spending response on new cars is suggestive of an important role for liquidity constraints.
The ESPs may have provided otherwise unavailable down payments for debtfinanced purchases of cars. In this case, whether this spending on autos would be
reversed in the short term would depend on whether the ESPs caused all households
to on average buy a car a few months sooner, leading to no subsequent short-term
decline in aggregate demand, or whether those whose ESPs did not cause them
to purchase a car immediately instead spent their ESPs on other items and were
constrained and unable to purchase cars a few months later, leading to a reversal in
demand.
In contrast, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that models of inattention seem unlikely to explain the results for autos. Under inattention, broadly
speaking, some households can be surprised by their receipt of an ESP. To illustrate
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the implications for spending, if such households spend about 10 percent of their
expenditures on cars on average (over time and across households), then an increase
in lifetime resources from an ESP would lead to an increase in lifetime consumption
of car services of about 10 percent of the ESP. If cars were infinitely lived, then this
would suggest an average increase in spending on cars of 10 percent of the ESP, a
number economically (though not statistically) much lower than we find.29
VII. Conclusion

We find that on average households spent about 12 to 30 percent of their stimulus payments, depending on the specification, on (CE-defined) nondurable expenditures during the three-month period in which the payments were received. This
response is larger than implied by the LCPIH or Ricardian equivalence. We also find
a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods, primarily the purchase of new
vehicles, bringing the average response of total consumption expenditures to about
50 to 90 percent of the payments in the quarter of receipt. These results are statistically and economically significant. They remain broadly consistent and significant
across specifications using different forms of variation. Indeed, the point estimates
are at the high end of these ranges in specifications that focus most directly on the
randomized timing of ESP receipt.
For nondurable expenditures, the estimated spending response to the 2008 ESPs
is generally only slightly smaller in magnitude (and not significantly different) than
the response to the 2001 tax rebates. This difference might partly reflect the more
transitory nature of the 2008 tax cut. However, the composition of spending is different than in 2001, so that the estimated spending effect on total expenditures is
larger than that in 2001 due to a larger role for durables in 2008. This difference
might partly reflect the larger size of the payments in 2008, or differences in macroeconomic situation. (For example, the doubling in the price of oil might have made
more households willing to use the rebate as a down payment to purchase a more
fuel-efficient new car). That said, the overall pattern of results is generally similar
in 2001 and 2008.
As in 2001, we also find some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response
in the subsequent three-month period after ESP receipt, but this response cannot
be estimated with precision. Regarding the implementation of the new method of
delivering tax cuts, the estimated responses do not significantly differ across paper
checks and electronic transfers.
Across households, according to the point estimates the spending responses are largest for older and low-income households, groups which have substantial and statistically significant responses. By assets, the estimated spending response is largest for
high-asset households, but this response is not statistically significantly different from
zero, and more generally all of the asset results suffer from a lack of statistical power.
Also, the estimated spending response is larger for homeowners than for renters.
Our estimates suggest a significant macroeconomic effect of the 2008 ESPs on
consumer demand, although as noted in the introduction, we do not measure either
29

Since cars are finite lived, the increase in spending should be even less than 10 percent. Incorporating adjustment costs would further reduce the short-term response.
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the general equilibrium impact on spending nor any spending changes not correlated with the timing of the ESP receipt (such as anticipatory effects). Using the
point estimates for total expenditures from Tables 2 and 3 (that ignore statistically
insignificant lagged spending effects), the receipt of the ESPs caused a partial-
equilibrium increase in demand of about 1.3 to 2.3 percent of PCE in 2008:II and
0.6 to 1.0 percent in 2008:III (at annual rates). Of course the ultimate effect of this
program on actual PCE depends on additional factors such as anticipatory effects,
price and interest rate adjustment, and multiplier effects.
Appendix: The 2008 ESP Survey Instrument
The following questions were asked in all CE interviews in June 2008–March 2009:
[Earlier this year/Last year] the Federal government approved an economic stimulus package. [Many households will receive a one-time economic stimulus payment, either by check or direct deposit/Previously you or your CU [[consumer unit]]
reported receiving one or more economic stimulus payments.] This is also called a
tax rebate and is different from a refund on your annual income taxes.
Since the first of the reference month, have you or any members of your CU received
a/an additional
10. Tax rebate? [Economic Stimulus Payment]
99. None/No more entries
Who was the rebate for? [enter text] _____________
* Collect each rebate separately and include the name(s) of the recipient(s).
In what month did you receive the rebate? [enter text] _____________
What was the total amount of the rebate? [enter value] _____________
* Probe if the amount is not an expected increment such as $300, $600, $900,
$1,200, etc
Was the rebate received by–?
1. check?
2. direct deposit?
Did you or any members of your CU receive any other tax rebate [economic stimulus
payment]?
1. Yes
2. No
If yes, return to “Who was the tax rebate for?”
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